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Abstract
We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hier-
archical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to
establish or severe relationships of authority or collaboration among themselves. We consider
two settings: we first consider individuals who do not seek the other party’s consent when es-
tablishing a relationship and then individuals who do. For both settings, we formally relate the
emerged hierarchical structures with the novel inclusion of well-motivated hierarchy promoting
terms in the individuals’ utility functions. We first analyze the game via a static analysis and
characterize all the hierarchical structures that can be formed as its solutions. We then consider
the game played dynamically under stochastic interactions among individuals implementing
better-response dynamics and analyze the nature of the converged networks.
1 Introduction
Hierarchies are ubiquitous forms of organization. Not surprisingly, early comparative studies be-
tween administrative and economic hierarchies, and other studies of hierarchies in the the context
of political organization, date back to the beginning of the twentieth century [25, 26]. Since then,
their study has encompassed a large variety of disciplines like, for example, labor and organiza-
tional economics [2, 30, 39], moral and evolutionary psychology [23, 29, 7, 37], anthropology [9] and
sociology [4, 31]. We remark that in the economics literature, the importance of hierarchies also
comes from the study of firms: the structure of firms can be understood as hierarchical structures in
production organizations (e.g., superiors having veto power over subordinates to access productive
assets) [6, 17]. In general, the empirical study of the emergence of hierarchical structures in social
networks has benefited from advancements in the field of sociometry [32], and, theoretically, graph
theoretical analysis has proven to be a useful tool for structural analysis of general hierarchical
structures [24]. In this paper, we adopt a game theoretical perspective to study the emergence of
hierarchical structures through what is known as network formation games. We propose a game and
analyze how its play leads to the emergence of hierarchies. The importance of our approach stems
from the fact that this game theoretical study allows us to investigate the underlying structures in
the individual utilities that promote the emergence of hierarchies from self-interested individuals.
Then, the importance of this work is that it defines micro-mechanisms on the individual level that
can lead to the emergence of hierarchical structures on the macro-level.
This work is supported by the U. S. Army Research Laboratory and the U. S. Army Research Office under
grant number W911NF-15-1-0577. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors
and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army Research
Laboratory or the U.S. Government.
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study about the emergence of hierarchical
network structures from a network formation perspective. However, we briefly mention that there
has been a considerable body of literature on the study of hierarchies from other game theoretical
perspectives [34]. For example, there are studies in the literature about allocation rules that take
into account explicit hierarchical relationships among the agents (e.g., [33]), and about the analysis
of games where agents have veto power over the actions of other players as a result of an underlying
hierarchical structure (e.g., [14]).
On the other hand, there is a mature body of work in the network formation game literature
related to other applications. Generally speaking, in a network formation game, self-interested or
utility-maximizing agents decide to form or severe links (interpreted as some sort of relationship)
with other agents so that they can form network structures that maximize some utility or allocation
value. The structure of connections resulting from playing the game induces an emergent network
whose topology can have different interpretations according to the specific application the game
is modeling. The literature on network formation games has a long trajectory which historically
started from a cooperative perspective, and has later devised a huge boom from a non-cooperative
perspective [18, 34]. We present an overview of the literature on network formation games accord-
ing to a classification of different previous approaches, this classification also introduces relevant
technical terms that will be useful in this paper. For other more algorithmic perspectives to the
subject in terms of solutions concepts and efficiency, not mentioned in this review, we refer to the
textbook treatment of the subject in [27, Chapter 19]. Network formation games have been ana-
lyzed via a static analysis, that is, the analysis of solution concepts that describes the emergence
of particular “stable” networks as a result of the agents playing the game. Additionally, they have
also been analyzed via a dynamic analysis, that is, the study of the emergence of a subset (or
possibly all) of the networks defined by the static analysis (also known as equilibrium selection) as
the result of some defined dynamic rules that describe the evolution of the agents’ actions [36, 38].
For example, [3] uses Nash equilibrium as solution concept, whereas [20] uses the solution concept
called pairwise stability (first introduced in [21]); and both works establish a dynamical analysis
of convergence towards “stable” networks in their respective solution concept. The two solution
concepts mentioned above are the ones that have been typically used in applications where the ef-
ficiency of the formed network was the main focus of study; however, in general, solution concepts
are proposed (and sometimes renamed) depending on the specific application to study from the
network formation perspective (whether there is only a static analysis or a dynamic one too). For
example, other solution concepts exist like the generalization of pairwise stability called strong sta-
bility also studied in the context of network efficiency [19], or like the solution concept introduced
in [22] which is particularly tailored for the problem of routing traffic on networks.
Broadly, the literature on network formation games can be classified according to the nature of
the agents that play the game and/or the nature of the connections they can establish. We discuss
first the possible nature of the agents. Traditionally, a first distinction is whether the agents
are non-consensual or consensual. A non-consensual agent i can establish links unilaterally with
agent j without j’s consent, i.e., without j having to agree to accept such link (see, e.g., [3]); and
a consensual i is the one who needs j’s consent or approval to establish a link (see, e.g., [20, 15, 1]).
Another second major distinction regarding the agents is whether they all have the same structure
in their utility or payoff function, i.e., the rewards or costs of making/maintaining/severing a link
is the same for any agent, which is know as the homogeneous case; or whether they have different
structures in their utility function, which is the heterogeneous case [12].
Regarding the distinction on the nature of the connections that agents can establish, network
formation games can be classified depending on whether the formed network is undirected (i.e.,
the edge or link between agents i and j has no direction) or directed (i.e., every edge or link has
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an intrinsic direction, so that an edge can be directed from i to j). The interpretation is that an
undirected edge between i and j gives a two-way benefit of flows, i.e., the utility generated by this
edge benefits both i and j. On the contrary, a directed edge from i to j has a one-way flow of benefits
since the utility generated by this edge benefits i but may or may not benefit j [3, 12]. Examples of
undirected relationships are friendships, collaborations (e.g., co-authorship), mutual insurance, etc.
Examples of directed relationships arise naturally in communication networks (e.g., someone send
an email to another person), loan relationships, subordinate-authority relationships, buyer-seller
relationships, etc. We refer to [13, Chapter 5] for more discussion on the use of undirected vs
directed graphs in game theoretical modeling.
We stress that not all network formation games in the literature have been studied from a
dynamic analysis (indeed, all the classifications presented above only have to do with the static
analysis aspect). A first classification from a dynamic analysis is to consider whether the agents,
at any time-step of the (discrete) evolution of the game, are myopic (e.g., [3, 20, 1]), i.e., they want
to only maximize their current utility at any time step, or, otherwise, foresighted (e.g., [10, 8, 35]),
i.e., they also want to maximize their (expected cumulative) future utility. Myopic agents are a
more reasonable assumption in contexts where agents live in a big and/or complex network, where
it is virtually impossible for a single agent to completely predict how her actions would influence
over the rest of the whole network and thus how current actions will affect future utility.
1.1 Contributions
Our first main contribution is to propose, to the best of our knowledge, a first study on the
emergence of hierarchical structures from the perspective of network formation games. We propose a
game which allows us to study and understand how self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals
lead to the emergence of networks with hierarchical structures. In particular, our work shows
this through the judicious inclusion of well-motivated hierarchical promoting terms in the utility
functions of the agents. We assume all agents are homogeneous, i.e., that we have an egalitarian
society, and we also assume that all individuals can be of two types: non-consensual or consensual.
For each type, we perform a static analysis of the emergent network structures that satisfy the
solution concept proposed for our game and which is closely related to other notions in the classic
literature of network formation games. Then, we present a dynamic analysis where we analyze the
dynamic formation of these networks as a result of a stochastic process of pairwise interactions
among agents playing better-response dynamics.
Our second contribution is a complete static analysis where we show that network structures
with different levels of hierarchy emerge as equilibrium networks, i.e., as solutions of the game, for
any type of agents. In particular, individuals within the same level or rank of hierarchy in these
structures can only have cooperative relationships. Moreover, we provide theoretical results that
show the relationship between the structure or topology of the formed equilibrium network and the
different parameters in the utility function of the agents. Then, we provide intuitive interpretations
of these theoretical results and their implications in real-world or practical scenarios. Moreover,
since the formation of hierarchies occurs within homogeneous agents, our results suggest that even
in egalitarian societies, hierarchies seem to be a natural outcome of socio-economic relationships.
Finally, we show that all possible equilibrium networks that can be formed by non-consensual agents
in any game are a strict subset of the ones that are possible to be formed in the same game by
consensual agents.
Our third contribution is to analyze our proposed network formation game when it is played
dynamically starting from any fixed initial graph. In such dynamic setting, agents are stochastically
chosen to perform an action and they play their better-response dynamics. We show that the
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networks, being formed dynamically, eventually converge to some equilibrium network in finite
time. Finally, we show that for any type of agent, the topology of the converged hierarchical
network, besides depending on the parameters of the utility functions, also depends on the particular
realization of the underlying stochastic process (i.e., the solution path).
We remark that the scope of our work, as seen in the previous contributions, does not include
the analysis of the efficiency or social welfare of the resulting equilibrium networks in the game
(e.g., we do not explore problems such as determining the factors that lead to a more/less efficient
equilibrium network), and, as mentioned in the conclusion, we leave this analysis as future work.
Instead, we focus on the full characterization and generation of equilibrium networks as hierarchical
structures, from both a static and dynamic analysis.
1.2 Notation and preliminary modeling
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of agents, and, throughout the paper, consider n ≥ 3. Let
ij := (i, j) ∈ N ×N . Any element of N is a node of the directed graph (digraph) G, and G is thus
defined by a set of ordered pairs between different elements of N .1 An element ij ∈ G is called an
edge from i to j. Let G+ ij := G ∪ {ij} and G− ij := G \ {ij}.
We define Nin(i, G) = {j ∈ N | ji ∈ G} and Nout(i, G) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ G}, with the in-degree
of i being din(i, G) = |Nin(i, G)|. Given G and i ∈ N , if Nin(i, G) = ∅ (Nout(i, G) = ∅) then i is a
source (sink). If ji ∈ G and ij /∈ G, then we say ij is a single edge; and, if ij, ji ∈ G then we say i
and j have an undirected edge. A graph is complete if there is an undirected edge between any pair
of nodes.
Whenever there exists a sequence of edges ik1, . . . , km−1j that connects i with j with no edge
appearing more than once and no node appearing more than in two edges, we say that there exists
a path of length m between i and j. Whenever j = i in the previous path, we say that this path is a
cycle containing i. We denote by C(G) the condensation graph of G, and by Γ(i, G) the connected
component of i ∈ N . Graph G is acyclic if it has no cycles, i.e., it has no paths of one node to
itself. A directed cycle is any cycle that contains at least one single edge.
We refer to Section A of the Appendix for basic graph theoretical terminology and concepts
that will be used throughout the paper.
New notation and definitions
Given a directed acyclic graph G′ and a node i of G′, the level of i, denoted by `i(G′), is the
largest number of arcs or edges from any source node of G′ to i. Also, for digraph G, the level
of i denoted by `i(C(G)), is the largest number of arcs in C(G) from any source of C(G) to the
strongly connected component containing i. See Figure 1(a).
We also define N sin(i, G) = Nin(i, G) \ {j ∈ Nin(i, G) | ij ∈ G} and dsin(i, G) = |N sin(i, G)|.
Consider a graph G and any i ∈ N . Given a node k ∈ N sin(i, G), we define Pi(G, k) = {i}∪{j ∈
N | kj ∈ G and ij, ji ∈ G} and Pi(G) = ∩k∈N sin(i,G)Pi(G, k). We use the term undirected connected
component whenever all edges of the connected component are undirected, and we call it complete
connected component when additionally it is a complete subgraph.
Given an undirected connected component that contains nodes i and j, we say the undirected
edge ij, ji ∈ G is critical if Γ(i, G) 6= Γ(i, G− ij).
1Strictly speaking, a graph is a pair (N,E), where N is the node set N and E is the edge set E. For simplicity,
we adopt a notation traditionally used in the network formation literature (e.g., see [18]) and refer to the graph by
its edge set; we let the context specify the node set.
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Finally, throughout the paper, we use the terms agent, node and individual interchangeably, as
well as the terms network and graph, and the terms edge and link.
0
1
2
3
0
1
(a)
i j
i j
(b)
‘
k
i
jm
(c)
Figure 1: In (a), we number the levels of all nodes in a directed acyclic graph. In (b), given two agents
i and j, we represent relationships of subordination in the upper figure (here, i is j’s subordinate), and
collaboration in the lower figure. In (c), Nin(i, G) = {j,m}, Nin(j,G) = {i,m}, N sin(i, G) = N sin(j,G) = {m},
Nin(k,G) = N sin(k,G) = {i}, Pi(G,m) = Pj(G,m) = Pi(G) = Pj(G) = {i, j}.
2 Proposed model and game
In our model, any single edge ij is a pairwise relationship that describes an unambiguous hierarchical
or authority relationship where agent j has a higher hierarchy or exercises some authority over i; so
we say j is a supervisor of i, and, respectively, that agent i is a subordinate of j. This simple concept
has been used extensively in the game theory literature [13]. On the other hand, whenever i and j
have an undirected edge, we understand that they have a collaborative or cooperative relationship,
and thus, they must share the same hierarchical status and no agent is the subordinate of the other
one. Accordingly, we have that N sin(j,G) is the set of j’s subordinates, Pj(G, i) is the set of j’s
collaborators who also have i as a common subordinate, and Pj(G) is the set of j’s collaborators
who have the same subordinates as j. See Figure 1(b) and Figure 1(c).
2.1 Utility definition
We first specify the costs and rewards that any agent incurs according to our proposed model.
(i) Subordinate-collaborative reward: From an organizational perspective, this represents the
positive reward an individual obtains by being the subordinate or collaborator of another
competent agent. For example, consider agent i wants to pursue her own goals (e.g., as an
employee), then she will seek direction and help from perhaps an equally or better skilled
person (e.g., a competent boss or co-worker). This reward can also be interpreted as an
exogenous reward (e.g., a salary) that an agent receives by working for or with other people
inside an organization. We represent the subordinate-collaborative reward per link by the
positive constant γ.
(ii) Hierarchical reward: Individuals who have a higher hierarchical status or position receive an
inherent reward for being in a higher position of power. For example, from an organizational
perspective, individuals with higher management or directive positions have skill sets that
are highly specialized to maintain such high hierarchical positions, and, as a consequence,
they are (mostly) better paid in the job market. Moreover, in political organizations and
public institutions, individuals with higher hierarchical positions can exert more influence
than those in lower positions (e.g., leaders or directives have more influence over ordinary
individuals in the society or over their political base). Then, the reward for these individuals
comes from the strength of their influence and the reach of the consequences of their decisions.
Mathematically, it is natural that if i and j both appear in some cycle, then agent i has no
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authority or any hierarchical power over j, and so i must have the same hierarchical reward
as j. Therefore, two agents in the same strongly connected component have the same reward.
In summary, we model the hierarchical reward for agent i in the graph G as a (strictly)
monotonic function which takes as an argument the level of i. Formally, the hierarchical
reward for an agent i situated in the network G is
H(`i(C(G)) (1)
We callH the reward function, and we assume it is non-negative and (strictly) monotonic (e.g.,
we have that H(0) ≥ 0). Intuitively, the monotonic property of H means that individuals
with higher positions of status are better rewarded.
(iii) Management cost: An individual i who is in charge of a group of people incurs on a manage-
ment cost directly proportional to the number of her subordinates. There are two possible
reasons for this. First, leading or directing more subordinates requires more managerial or
logistic work, thus demanding more energy than doing it with a smaller group, since i has to
respond to the demands of more people. Naturally, people who collaborate with i (i.e., any
j such that ij, ji ∈ G) do not incur a management cost to i. Second, from an organizational
perspective, a supervisor i is responsible for the group she leads, and she also needs to report
to her immediate superiors (i.e., the people, if any, to whom she is a subordinate) about how
the people she is responsible for are performing. This reporting task, obviously, requires more
work when i is directing larger groups. Observe that management costs must be reduced if
i is part of a team of people who also manage or direct her same subordinates since this
team will collaborate with her and thus reduce the workload on i. Formally, we model the
management cost as c
∑
k∈N sin(i,G)
1
|Pi(G,k)| (observe that this quantity is well-defined) for some
positive constant c > 0. The chosen functional form for the management cost captures the
qualitative behaviors mentioned above: the larger the number of subordinates of i (i.e., the
larger the set N sin(i, G)), the larger the cost; and the larger the number of collaborators (i.e.,
the larger the set Pi(G, k) with k ∈ N sin(i, G)), the smaller the cost.
We conclude that the utility of an individual is the sum of her subordinate-collaborative and
hierarchical rewards minus her management cost.
Definition 2.1 (Utility function). The utility that an individual i incurs given a graph G is
ui(G) = |Nout(i, G)|γ +H(`i(C(G))− c
∑
k∈N sin(i,G)
1
|Pi(G, k)| (2)
Clearly, if i has no connections and no other agent is her subordinate in G, then ui(G) = 0.
Example 1: We present a couple of graphs for which we compute the utilities of some agents
to better illustrate the calculation using equation (2). Consider Figure 2. If G is as in (a), then
ui(G) = 2γ +H(1)− 3
2
c, uj(G) = γ +H(1)− 1
2
c, uk(G) = H(2)− c, um(G) = 2γ +H(0).
If G is as in (b), then
ui(G) = 2γ +H(2)− c, uj(G) = γ +H(2)− 2c, uk(G) = γ +H(2)− c.
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Figure 2: Network examples.
2.2 Game formulation and solution concept
Having defined the utility that individuals obtain from their membership in the network G, we now
complete the definition of our proposed network formation game in strategic (or normal) form [11].
An agent i ∈ N can only perform two types of actions over the network G: establishing an edge
ij so that ij ∈ G, or severing an existing edge ij so that ij /∈ G. Regarding the agent’s type,
we say i is consensual whenever i requires j’s agreement to establish the link ij; otherwise, i is
non-consensual whenever she can perform such action irrespective of j’s agreement.
Definition 2.2 (Hierarchical network formation game). A hierarchical network formation game G
is defined by the set of homogeneous agents N = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 3, the utility function for
any agent i ∈ N as defined in (2). Let Ai = {0, 1}n be the action space of i ∈ N , so that any
ai = (aij) ∈ Ai is an action (or pure strategy) for agent i. Given a graph G, we say agent i has
taken action aij = 1 if ij ∈ G; and, otherwise, has taken action aij = 0 if ij /∈ G. Let (γ,H, c) be
the utility parameters that define the payoff of any agent as in Definition 2.1, and a = (a1, . . . , an)
be the action (or pure strategy) profile which takes values from the set A = (A1, . . . ,An). Then, we
represent the hierarchical network formation game G by the tuple (N, u,A, γ,H, c) along with the
specification of whether all agents are consensual or non-consensual.
As it is usual in the literature on network formation games, we only consider pure strategies
throughout the paper. We also consider that any agent i ∈ N is self-interested or utility-maximizing
and so she wants to chose the action profile that maximizes her utility (2).
Remark 2.1 (About the game’s modeling scope). Firstly, we observe that an agent can only add
or remove an outgoing edge, i.e., she decides who supervises her or who she wants to work for.
This captures scenarios where people can decide to join (or apply for) a specific team at work or
some program, and are able to quit when desired. In the case of non-consensual agents, since an
agent always accepts an incoming edge, this assumption does not capture scenarios where managers
have more power selecting their employees compared to the power employees have in selecting their
managers. However, this scenario is captured in the case of non-consensual agents: agents have
the managerial power to select or hire which individuals will be their subordinates from the pool of
applicants.
Secondly, we observe that an agent cannot remove an incoming edge. This models a sense
of responsibility on the agents: an agent accepts to supervise an individual (whether the type is
non-consensual or consensual) knowing that she will not be able to stop supervising if she “later
regrets” having such responsibility. This also models situations where an ex-ante contract protects
subordinates from being indiscriminately fired, but does not model scenarios where there is more
managerial power in firing employees.
We propose and use the following solution concept for hierarchical network formation games:
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Definition 2.3 (Equilibrium network). A network G is an equilibrium network when, for any
i, j ∈ N ,
(i) if ij ∈ G then ui(G) > ui(G− ij) and;
(ii) if ij /∈ G, then
• for non-consensual agents: ui(G) > ui(G+ ij),
• for consensual agents: either ui(G) > ui(G+ ij), or, if ui(G) ≤ ui(G+ ij) then uj(G) >
uj(G+ ij).
Remark 2.2 (Connection to other solution concepts). The concept of an equilibrium network
becomes the concept of strict Nash equilibrium whenever the agents are non-consensual, and it
becomes the concept of pairwise stability when the agents are consensual (with the difference that
our concept employ strict inequalities in contrast to the definitions of pairwise stability found in
other works, e.g., [21]).
If there exists some edge ij with i, j ∈ N that can be added (or severed) so that ui(G + ij) ≥
ui(G) (or ui(G − ij) ≥ ui(G)), i.e., so that some condition on the utilities of i as described in
Definition 2.3 is violated, then we say that i has an incentive or intention to establish (or sever)
the link ij respectively. Obviously, when any agent has an incentive to severe some link, then G is
not an equilibrium network for any type of agents. However, if agent i has an incentive to establish
a link, then G is not an equilibrium network for non-consensual agents, but may or may not be one
for consensual agents (recall that for consensual agents, the addition of the edge ij also depends
on j).
We conclude by providing some further interpretations and intuition on the agents’ types. A
non-consensual agent i can be thought of being “greedy” because i accepts any agent that intends
to be her subordinate or collaborator. Intuitively, we can think of greediness from two perspectives:
as a bounded rationality aspect, since i can accept more subordinates even though this would mean
a negative impact on her utility; or perhaps as a foresightedness feature of i, since i may accept any
subordinate with the hope of having a larger future hierarchical reward. On the other hand, we
can think of a consensual agent i as being “non-greedy” since she does not want to acquire more
subordinates than what she can really handle, i.e., if acquiring more subordinates will affect her
utility negatively.
3 Static Analysis
3.1 Hierarchical structures
We introduce a useful class of networks that abstracts and represents the concept of hierarchies.
Intuitively, agents with a higher level have higher positions of power, and formally, this is true,
since agents with a higher level have a greater hierarchical reward (see equation (1)). When k
different connected components have the same level `, we say there are k components per level `.
If the maximum level that any agent in the network has is `, then we say the network has ` + 1
levels.
Definition 3.1 (Hierarchical structures). A (weakly) connected digraph G is a hierarchical struc-
ture if each connected component is an undirected subgraph, and it is additionally a sequential
hierarchy if there is only one connected component per any level, and, if there is more than one
level, then any node has a single edge towards any other node of a higher level.
A hierarchical structure G has the particularity that any of its connected components are
composed of agents that form strong collaborative units or teams, i.e., all agents in a connected
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component are collaborators. Thus, G is naturally a hierarchical representation of the organization,
power and/or influences among teams of people (with the understanding that a team may be
composed of a single individual). Now, a sequential hierarchy G is a hierarchical representation
in which there is only one team at each rank or level of the hierarchy. Observe that a particular
trivial case of a hierarchical structure which is also a sequential hierarchy is when the network is
complete, i.e., all agents form a unique team. See Figure 3 for examples of hierarchical structures.
Observe that a pyramidal structure is formed by a hierarchical structure with two or more levels,
generally with one connected component per any level, and such that the number of agents that
have a lower level is greater than the ones that have a higher one. This type or class of graphs is
easily found in real life hierarchies; for example, military organizations (there are less generals than
colonels, but less colonels than lieutenants, etc.) and clerical hierarchies in the Catholic church [?]
(there is only one Pope, and more bishops, but there are less bishops than priests) have this type
of hierarchies. Moreover, it is known that many companies naturally adopt a pyramidal structure
for its management organizations [28], with the CEO or president at the top, followed by a small
executive leadership or vice-presidents, followed by tiers of middle managers, and all the way down
to the lowest level employees.
A
B
A
B
(a)
A
B
A
B
(b)
Figure 3: Consider each subfigure, (a) and (b), as an example of a digraph G which has its condensation
graph C(G) represented by the graph with white-colored nodes on the left, and which has a subgraph
corresponding to the nodes A and B of C(G) represented by a graph with gray-colored nodes on the right.
In (a) we have a particular example of a hierarchical structure which is not a sequential hierarchy, whereas in
(b) we have a hierarchical structure which is a sequential hierarchy. In both cases, all agents corresponding
to node A in C(G) have level 2, whereas all agents corresponding to node B in C(G) have level 1.
3.2 Solution Analysis
Now, we introduce the main results for this section. All relevant proofs can be found in Section B
of the Appendix.
Theorem 3.1 (Non-consensual agents). Consider non-consensual agents. A network G is an
equilibrium network for some game G if and only if it is a sequential hierarchy that satisfies the
following conditions:
(i) If the network has k > 1 levels, then the following condition holds:
H(`)−H(`− 1) > γ + c
( |Pi(G)|+ |{j | `j(C(G)) < `}|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+ 1)
)
(3)
for any i, j ∈ N such that `i(C(G)) = ` and `j(C(G)) = `− 1 with 0 < ` ≤ k − 1.
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(ii) If there exists some critical edge ij, ji ∈ G, then
H(`+ 1)−H(`) < γ + c
(
1 +
|{j | `j(C(G)) < `}|
2
)
where `i(C(G)) = ` ≥ 0. (4)
Moreover, there exist sequential hierarchies that are not equilibrium networks for any hierarchical
network formation game.
Remark 3.2 (Interpretation of Theorem 3.1). The importance of equations (3) and (4) is that they
relate the agents’ utility parameters (γ,H, c) with the specific topology of the sequential hierarchy G
resulting from the hierarchical network formation game with non-consensual agents.
We start by interpreting equation (3). A first observation is that this equation specifies how the
increment in the hierarchical reward between the current level ` and the previous level ` − 1, i.e.,
∆(H) := H(`) − H(` − 1), restricts the number of agents that can exist at level `, i.e., |Pi(G)|.
Interestingly, the larger the increment ∆(H), the smaller the number of agents that can possibly
exist with level ` in an equilibrium network.2 From an organizational point of view, this can be
interpreted as follows: whenever there is a large difference in power between two consecutive levels
in the hierarchy of an organization, we can then expect to find less people in the higher level.
For example, in a company, there are fewer executives than managers. Therefore, the equilibrium
networks from Theorem 3.1 are able to model a pyramidal structure with N levels by, for example,
enforcing monotonic increments in the hierarchical reward (e.g., H(1) − H(0) < H(2) − H(1) <
· · · < H(N)−H(N − 1)). Moreover, this reflects a natural organizational phenomenon: the salary
difference between higher positions in an organization are more accentuated than between lower
positions.
A second observation of equation (3) is the following: if inequality (3) is satisfied for greater
values of the management cost parameter c, then it is possible to find a greater number of agents
with level `.3 This has an intuitive explanation: more agents can be found on level ` because this
implies that any agent in this level has more collaborators with whom to reduce the management
cost that otherwise would be larger due to the larger value of c.
We now interpret equation (4). First observe that, since the equilibrium networks are sequential
hierarchies, all connected components are complete subgraphs. Therefore, whenever there is a criti-
cal edge, it must belong to a connected component of two nodes. Then, equation (4) says that agent
i with level ` and who has a critical edge, has no incentive in severing its collaborative tie with j
if, for example, her subordinate-collaborative reward γ is large enough to counteract the increase
on the hierarchical reward that she would get by severing her critical edge. This condition seems
restrictive because it implies an upper bound on ∆(H), however, we remark that this condition is
only present whenever a critical edge exists, i.e., whenever a group of only two people exist for some
level. Indeed, later in this paper, in Theorem 4.4, a result is presented where agents dynamically
play the hierarchical network formation game and a network with no critical edges is formed.
Theorem 3.3 (Consensual agents). Consider consensual agents. A network G is an equilibrium
network for some game G if and only if G is composed by one or multiple hierarchical structures
and G satisfy the following conditions:
(i) If a hierarchical structure in G has k > 1 levels, then
H(`)−H(`−m) > γ + c
∑
p∈N sin(i,G)\{j}
( |Pi(G+ ij, p)| − |Pi(G, p)|
|Pi(G, p)||Pi(G+ ij, p)|
)
+
c
|Pi(G, j)| > 0 (5)
2To analyze this fact in the right-hand side of equation (3) observe that the function x 7→ x+a
x(x+1)
with x > 0 and
positive constant a, is monotonically decreasing.
3Please, see the previous footnote.
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for any i, j ∈ N belonging to this hierarchical structure and such that ji ∈ G, with `i(C(G)) =
` ≤ k − 1 and `j(C(G)) = `−m for any appropriate 0 ≤ m ≤ `.
(ii) If there exists i, j ∈ N such that `i(C(G)) = ` ≥ 0 and `j(C(G)) = ` − m ≥ 0 for any
appropriate 0 ≤ m ≤ `, and such that there exists no path from i to j (whether i and j belong
to the same hierarchical structure or not), then
H(`+ 1)−H(`−m) < c. (6)
(iii) If there exists a critical edge ij, ji ∈ G such that `i(C(G)) = ` ≥ 0 and `i(C(G− ij)) = `+ 1,
then
H(`+ 1)−H(`) < γ + c
∑
p∈N sin(i,G)
( |Pi(G, p)| − |Pi(G− ij, p)|
|Pi(G, p)||Pi(G− ij, p)|
)
+ c. (7)
Moreover, there exist hierarchical structures, which are possibly sequential hierarchies, that are not
equilibrium networks for any hierarchical network formation game.
Remark 3.4 (Interpretation of Theorem 3.3). From Theorem 3.3 we conclude that consensual
agents allow the formation of a wider variety of hierarchical structures than non-consensual agents.
Indeed, given a game G with non-consensual agents, any of its equilibrium networks is also an
equilibrium network for the same game but with consensual agents. We also remark that consensual
agents allow equilibrium networks that are not connected. See Figure 4.
Therefore, we note that equations (5) and (7) from Theorem 3.3 are the more general versions
of equations (3) and (4) from Theorem 3.1, respectively, and, despite having a more intricate
expression, inherit a similar qualitative interpretation from their counterparts (as explained in
Remark 3.2).
Equation (6) can only be present in the case of consensual agents (i.e., it has no counterpart for
non-consensual agents) for two reasons. The first reason is that it must be satisfied, for example,
when the equilibrium network consists of two or more hierarchical structures, or if the equilibrium is
a hierarchical structure whose condensation graph has multiple sources. The second reason is that
this condition is a result of the non-consensual interaction: considering the statement (ii) of the
theorem, if agent i wants to establish a connection with j (observe that i has a higher level than j),
j will not consent i’s intention of becoming her subordinate if the increase of management cost is
larger than the increase of hierarchical reward that j would obtain from having i as a subordinate.
It is easy to construct games with consensual agents in which one or multiple sequential hier-
archies (including complete networks) are equilibrium networks. The next proposition gives other
non-trivial examples of equilibrium networks for a game with consensual agents.
Proposition 3.5 (Examples of equilibrium networks for consensual agents). Consider any hierar-
chical structure G with more than one level, one complete connected component per any level whose
size is greater than two, and such that the only existing edges in the graph are as follows: for any
i, j ∈ N with `i(C(G)) = ` and `j(C(G)) = `+ 1, pk ∈ G for any p ∈ Γ(i, G), k ∈ Γ(j,G). Then,
(i) G, or
(ii) any network composed by two or more (isolated) hierarchical structures with the same proper-
ties as G and the additional property that |Pi(G)| ≥ |Pj(G)| for any i, j ∈ N with `j(C(G)) =
`i(C(G))− 1 > 0.
is an an equilibrium network for some game with consensual agents.
Remark 3.6 (Existence of hierarchical structures that are not solutions of the game). As men-
tioned by both Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, there exist hierarchical structures that cannot be equilibrium
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Figure 4: We depict the condensation graph of a network G containing three isolated hierarchical structures
that are possible to result as a solution to a hierarchical network formation game with consensual agents
(provided the adequate utility parameters exist). Notice that each isolated network has the topology of
another possible equilibrium network for consensual agents, but not for non-consensual ones.
networks of any hierarchical network formation game, i.e., there exist hierarchical structures which
are distinct from the equilibrium networks of all possible tuples (N, u,A, γ,H, c) that define a game
with either consensual or non-consensual agents.
4 Dynamic Analysis
We now explore the emergence of hierarchical structures when agents play a hierarchical network
formation game dynamically, which we call the network formation process.
Definition 4.1 (Network formation process). Consider a hierarchical network formation game G
and any fixed graph Go. At each time step t = 0, 1, . . . :
(i) Consider the action profile at time t as a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , an(t)) and the respective emergent
network as G(t). If t = 0, then consider G(0) = Go.
(ii) Select a pair of agents (i, j), i 6= j, randomly and independently from N ×N with all possible
pairs of different agents only having positive probabilities of being selected according to some
time-invariant distribution.
(iii) Then:
(a) For non-consensual agents:
aij(t+1)
{
= arg maxa∗ij∈{0,1} ui(a
∗
ij , a−ij(t)), if maxa∗ij∈{0,1} ui(a
∗
ij , a−ij(t)) > ui(a(t))
∈ {0, 1} \ {aij(t)}, otherwise
.
(8)
(b) For consensual agents: let first i consider the action a∗ij as if she was a non-consensual
agent. If ij ∈ G(t), then aij(t+ 1) = a∗ij. Now, if ij /∈ G(t) and a∗ij = 1, then since i is
a consensual agent, we have that aij(t + 1) = 1 if and only if uj(G(t) + ij) ≥ uj(G(t))
(otherwise, obviously, aij(t+ 1) = 0).
Remark 4.1. The network formation process, as clearly seen in Definition 4.1, implements a
better-response dynamics4 for each agent, in which each utility-maximizing agent plays the game
sequentially and myopically, i.e., they maximize their current utility (given the constraint of their
actions) without any foresightedness or being forward-looking. Note, however, that when the agent’s
utility is the same irrespective of what action she can take in the next time step, she will prefer
4We remark that the network formation process implements a better-response dynamics because an agent i can
only consider the addition or deletion of a single edge per time step. If, on the other hand, i is able to select the best
pure strategy in her action space Ai per time step, i.e., being able to alter multiple edges at the same time, we would
say the network formation process implements a best-response dynamics.
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changing her action in the next time step (since the action space has only two states, this simply
means switching her current action in the next time step). Myopic agents are a natural assumption
when networks are big or complex, since in this case it is hard for an agent to trace all the past
actions from every other member of the network or predict what the repercussion of her actions
will be over the rest of agents. Likewise, myopic agents have the least cognitive and informational
requirements about the history of the played game: they only need to remember what happened in
the previous time-step. These assumptions have been widely used in the literature, e.g., [3]. We
also remark that pairwise selection of agents in dynamic settings of network formation games (as
in step (ii) from Definition 4.1) has been widely used in the literature of network formation games,
e.g., [20].
Formally speaking, the network formation process induces a homogeneous Markov chain M
whose state space is the set of all possible graphs with N nodes (defined by all possible action profiles
the agents can take), and whose transition probabilities are immediately defined as an induced
measure from the underlying pairwise selection process defined in step (ii) from Definition 4.1. See
Figure 5 for an example of a one-step transition in the network formation process.
We proceed to analyze the convergence properties of the network formation process. All relevant
proofs can be found in Section C of the Appendix.
GC(t) GC(t+1)
A
B
Figure 5: Example of a one-step transition in the network formation process. At some time t ≥ 0, we have
an emergent network G(t) with its condensation graph GC(t). Assume the pair of agents (i, j) is chosen at
time t by the network formation process, with i such that Γ(i, G(t)) corresponds to node A and j such that
Γ(j,G(t)) corresponds to node B in GC(t). Then GC(t+ 1), which is the condensation graph of G(t+ 1), is
as shown in the figure for non-consensual agents, and for consensual agents if and only if H(2)−H(0) ≥ c.
Definition 4.2 (Invariant networks). Consider the network formation process. An invariant net-
work G∗ is any network such that if G(t) = G∗ then, with probability one, G(t+ 1) = G∗.
Proposition 4.2. A network is invariant for the network formation process if and only if it is an
equilibrium network.
Proof. Consider any invariant network G∗ and any (i, j) ∈ N × N (with i 6= j). Consider first
non-consensual agents. If ij ∈ G∗ then it must follow that ui(G∗) > ui(G∗ − ij); otherwise, if
ui(G) ≤ ui(G∗ − ij), then item (iii) from Definition 4.1 implies that i will change her action in the
next time step and thus the topology of G∗, which gives a contradiction. A similar proof can be
done to show that if ij /∈ G∗, then ui(G∗) > ui(G∗ + ij); and by Definition 2.3, conclude that G∗
is an equilibrium network. Now, for consensual agents, it only suffices to analyze what happens
when ij /∈ G∗ and ui(G∗) ≤ ui(G∗ + ij), i.e., the case in which, agent i’s action in the next time
step would be 1 if she was non-consensual. In such case, according to item (iii) from Definition 4.1,
it must follow that uj(G
∗ + ij) < uj(G∗), so that i has no consent from j and will not change her
current action 0 in the next time step. This implies, according to Definition 2.3, that G∗ is an
equilibrium network.
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Given an equilibrium network, it is easy to show it is also an invariant network from Defini-
tion 2.3 and the fact that only a pair of agents is selected per time step in the network formation
process.
Formally speaking, Proposition 4.2 tells us that a network G is an absorbing state of the Markov
chain M if and only if it is an equilibrium network.
Problem 4.3 (Important problems). The first and most important problem to solve is whether
(i) the network formation process, which results from the agents playing (myopic) better-response
dynamics starting from a fixed arbitrary initial graph, can lead convergence to an equilibrium net-
work, or (ii) if the individuals may never settle down in forming an invariant network so that their
formed networks are continually oscillating between different configurations. Once convergence to
an equilibrium network is proved, a second natural problem is the further exploration of the specific
structures or topology of the formed equilibrium networks.
Theorem 4.4 (Convergence of the network formation process). Consider the network formation
process, with an arbitrary initial network Go, for a game G with a fixed type of agents and such that
H(`+ 1)−H(`) > γ + cN for any integer 0 ≤ ` ≤ N − 1. With probability one, G(t) converges in
finite time to an equilibrium network with no critical edges and such that it is connected (according
to the conditions stipulated in Theorem 3.1 or Theorem 3.3 depending on the type of agents).
The following corollary follows from the proof construction of Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.5 (Convergence starting from an empty graph). Consider the network formation
process with an empty initial network Go = ∅, for a game G with a fixed type of agents and such
that H(`+1)−H(`) > γ+cN for any integer 0 ≤ ` ≤ N−1. With probability one, G(t) converges in
finite time to an equilibrium network with only single edges and such that it is connected (according
to the conditions stipulated in Theorem 3.1 or Theorem 3.3 depending on the type of agents).
Remark 4.6 (Analysis of results). There are important remarks to make about the convergence
results for consensual agents. In general, the final or converged network from the network formation
process (for any type of agents) depends on both the initial network and the specific realization path
of the underlying stochastic process, i.e., the final network is a random function of the initial
conditions. This is known as path dependence [3]: depending on the initial graph, there may be
a positive probability of converging to more than one invariant network, provided this is allowed
by the utility parameters and the topology of the initial graph. This gives the intuition that in
egalitarian societies, the topology of the hierarchies that may emerge have a random component in
it. See Example 2 for an illustration of this phenomenon. Finally, notice how starting the network
formation process from an empty graph greatly reduces the final topology of the possible converged
equilibrium network (e.g., compare Corollary 4.5 to Theorem 4.4).
We provide a small example to illustrate the observations made in Remark 4.6 regarding path
dependence.
Example 2: (Simple examples of network formation processes and path dependence)
Consider the network formation process starting from an empty graph with three agents, i.e.,
N = {1, 2, 3} for some game.
Consider first consensual agents in a game with utility parameters such that H(1) − H(0) =
H(2) − H(1) > γ + c, and consider (a, b, c) to be any permutation of elements of N . Then, if
the first three selected pairs are {(a, b), (a, c), (c, b)}, then the process converges to the invariant
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network G1(a, b, c) = {ab, ac, cb} with probability one. However, if the first two selected pairs
are {(a, b), (b, c)}, then the process converges to the invariant network G2(a, b, c) = {ab, bc} with
probability one. We conclude that, when starting from an empty graph, the equilibrium networks
G1 and G2 (for different values of (a, b, c)) have a positive probability of being the invariant network
towards which the network converges to, i.e., there is path dependence.
Now, consider non-consensual agents. If the utility parameters of the game are such that 0 <
H(1) − H(0) < γ + c, then the converged network is a complete network with probability one,
i.e., no matter what is the realization of the stochastic process, the network always converges to a
complete one. Now, assume H(1)−H(0) > γ + c. First consider H(2)−H(1) > γ + c. Then, the
converged network has a structure of the form G = {ab, ac, bc}, where any possible permutation
(a, b, c) of elements of N has a positive probability of appearing. Similarly, if H(2)−H(1) < γ+ c,
then the converged network has a structure of the form G = {ab, bc, cb, ac} where any possible
permutation (a, b, c) of elements of N has a positive probability of appearing. In conclusion, if
H(1)−H(0) < γ + c then there is path dependency; otherwise, if H(1)−H(0) > γ + c then there
is no path dependence.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose, to the best of our knowledge, the first network formation game model that
explains the emergence of hierarchical structures in a society. We consider both non-consensual and
consensual agents, and study the different topologies of hierarchies that can emerge as solutions of
a game. Moreover, we develop a network formation process in which the agents play stochastically
the game sequentially and myopically, and characterize the possible final formed networks. We
learn that the introduction of hierarchical rewards that increasingly benefit the agents of higher
hierarchy or power, is crucial in determining both the total number of levels in the final hierarchical
structure and the maximum number of individuals that can share the same level. Moreover, we
learn that it is plausible that individuals within the same level cooperate with each other.
Our paper motivates future work on the analysis of hierarchical structures, like, for example,
the proposal of new models that can display either a narrower or a wider variety of other forms
of hierarchies than the ones presented in this paper. One way to possibly achieve this, is by the
judicious incorporation of heterogeneous agents in the game that may have different structures of
subordinate-collaborative or hierarchical rewards. Another possible future work is to define different
dynamic processes of network formation that perhaps can drive the agents to different equilibrium
selection outcomes and study why such phenomena may happen.
As pointed out in Remark 2.1, a direction of future research is to extend our proposed game to
allow agents to severe incoming connections from her subordinates. Moreover, a second research
direction is to study the effect of stability of the equilibrium networks of the game, and further
study the conditions that could lead more or less efficient equilibrium networks in terms of the game
parameters. Finally, from an organizational point of view, it is relevant to theoretically understand
under what conditions are flat or steep hierarchies preferable in terms of the game’s parameters.
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A Basic graph theoretical definitions
Consider a directed graph (digraph) G. Graph G is strongly connected whenever there exist a
path between any two of its nodes; and, by convention, any graph composed by a single node is
in itself strongly connected. We say that i and j are weakly connected when, if we consider all
edges of G being undirected, there exists a path from one of these nodes to the other, and we say
that G is (weakly) connected if any two nodes are (weakly) connected. If G is not connected, then
any connected subgraph such that no other node of G is connected to any of its nodes, is called
an isolated network.
A (strongly) connected component of G is a subgraph of G that is strongly connected and such
that no additional edges or nodes from G can be included in the subgraph without violating its
property of being strongly connected. We can partition the nodes of G according to which connected
component they belong to. The condensation graph of G is the graph resulting from contracting
every strongly connected component of G into a single node, and it is an acyclic graph.
B Proofs for the Static Analysis section
We first introduce a couple of useful technical results.
Lemma B.1. For both non-consensual and consensual agents, an equilibrium network cannot have
directed cycles, and thus, only has undirected connected components. In particular, for the case of
non-consensual agents, all connected components are complete subgraphs.
Proof. By contradiction, consider an equilibrium network G and a single edge ij ∈ G such that
a directed cycle involving the node i exists with the edge ij belonging to such cycle. We analyze
whether j has an incentive to start a collaboration with i. Observe that H(`j(G)) = H(`j(G+ ji)),
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|Pj(G, k)| ≤ |Pj(G+ ji, k)| for any k ∈ N sin(j,G) with k 6= i. Then,
uj(G+ ji)− uj(G) =
γ(|Nout(j,G)|+ 1) +H(`j(G+ ji))− c ∑
k∈N sin(j,G)\{i}
1
|Pj(G+ ij, k)|

−
γ|Nout(j,G)|+H(`j(G))− c ∑
k∈N sin(j,G)
1
|Pj(G, k)|

= γ + c
 ∑
k∈N sin(j,G)
1
|Pj(G, k)| −
∑
k∈N sin(j,G)\{i}
1
|Pj(G+ ij, k)|

> 0.
Thus, j has an incentive to establish the edge ji. For non-consensual agents, this would contradict
the fact that G is an equilibrium network, and so G cannot have single edges in any connected
component, which implies that all connected components are undirected subgraphs. Now, assume
that agents are consensual and continue the analysis to see if i has an incentive in accepting a link
from j. We can easily show that
ui(G+ ji)− ui(G) = c
∑
k∈N sin(i,G)
(
1
|Pi(G, k)| −
1
|Pi(G+ ji, k)|
)
≥ 0
since |Pi(G+ ij, k)| ≥ |Pi(G, k)| for any k ∈ N sin(i, G). Thus, i will accept collaborating with j, and
this immediately implies that G must only have undirected connected components for consensual
agents.
Now, assume we have any i, j ∈ N with ij, ji /∈ G belonging to the same undirected connected
component of G and that this connected component is not a complete subgraph. Then, it is easy
to show that ui(G + ij) − ui(G) = γ > 0, and so i has an incentive to form the connection
ij. For non-consensual agents, this contradicts G being an equilibrium network, from which we
immediately conclude that all connected components must be complete subgraphs. Now, consider
consensual agents. Then, it is easy to show that uj(G + ij) − uj(G) = −c 1|Pj(G,i)| < 0, and so j
has no incentive in accepting a single edge from i. Thus, the connected components of G are not
necessarily complete for consensual agents.
Corollary B.1. Consider any graph G without directed cycles. Then, no agent has an incentive
to sever any single edge.
Proof. Given the graph G, consider any i, j ∈ N such that ij ∈ G and ji /∈ G; and observe that
ui(G− ij)− ui(G) = −γ < 0.
Now, we introduce the important proofs of our Solution Analysis section.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Throughout the proof, let Ti(G) := |Nout(i, G)|γ. We denote by i → j the
fact that there exists a path between i and j, and, with a slight abuse of notation, we will also use
it to denote the set of edges that compose some path between i and j, so that clearly i→ j ⊂ G.5
Part I: We first prove that any given sequential hierarchy as stipulated in items (i) and (ii) of
the theorem statement, is the equilibrium network for some game G. Consider a given sequential
5Note that there might be multiple paths between i and j and so there is some ambiguity as to which specific
path i→ j refers to, but this will not be a problem throughout the paper.
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hierarchy G. Now, we choose any c, γ > 0 and fix their values. Then, the remaining problem is to
find a reward function H so that G is an equilibrium network for the game G = (N, u,A, γ,H, c).
Then, for G to be an equilibrium network, we need to ensure that no agent is able to establish new
links or severe existing ones as pointed out in Definition 2.3. Let k be the number of levels of G.
If k = 1, then the network is complete with ui(G − ij) = γ(n − 2) + H(0) − c/(n − 1) and
ui(G) = γ(n−1)+H(0) for any i, j ∈ N ; which gives ui(G− ij)−ui(G) = −γ− c/(n−1) < 0 since
n ≥ 3. Thus, there is no incentive for any agent of the network to severe a link, irrespective of the
function H. Thus, any non-negative monotonic function H can be chosen as the reward function.
Let us assume now that we have k > 1.
Case 1: Assume i has level 0 < ` ≤ k − 1 and that she considers establishing a link with
some agent j that has level ` − 1 (recall that ij ∈ G), which we call an immediate backward
connection. Then, ui(G) = Ti(G) + H(`) − c |{j | `j(C(G))<`}||Pi(G)| and ui(G + ij) = Ti(G) + γ + H(` −
1)− c |{j | `j(C(G))<`}|−1|Pi(G)|+1 , and thus
ui(G+ ij)− ui(G) = H(`− 1)−H(`) + γ + c
( |Pi(G)|+ |{j | `j(C(G)) < `}|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+ 1)
)
.
Having this previous expression being less than zero would suffice for a non-consensual agent to not
have an incentive to establish immediate backward links, which is the same as choosing a function
H that satisfies condition (i) of the theorem statement (observe that S must be, indeed, strictly
increasing since the sequence {|{j | `j(C(G)) < `}|}k−1`=1 is also strictly increasing for k > 2).
Case 2: Assume i has level 0 < ` ≤ k − 1 and that she considers establishing a connec-
tion with an agent j that has level ` − m for m > 1 (assuming, obviously, that such j exists).
Let q`(G) = |{j | `j(C(G)) = `}| be the number of agents that have rank ` in the graph
G. Then, ui(G) = Ti(G) + H(`) − c |{j | `j(C(G))<`}|q`(G) and ui(G + ij) = Ti(G) + γ + H(` − m) −
c
( |{j | m<`j(C(G))<`}|
q`(G)
+
|{j | `j(C(G))≤m}|
q`(G)+1
)
; and thus
ui(G+ ij)− ui(G) = −(H(`)−H(`−m)) + γ + c |{j | `j(C(G)) ≤ m}|
q`(G)(q`(G) + 1)
=−
m−1∑
p=0
(H(`− p)−H(`− (p+ 1))) + γ + c |{j | `j(C(G)) ≤ m}|
q`(G)(q`(G) + 1)
.
Now, if (3) holds, then −(H(`− p)−H(`− (p+ 1)) < −γ − c
(
q`−p(G)+|{j | `j(C(G))<`−p}|
q`−p(G)(q`−p(G)+1)
)
for any
0 ≤ p ≤ `− 1; from which it follows that
ui(G+ ij)− ui(G) = −(H(`)−H(`− 1))−
m−1∑
p=1
(H(`− p)−H(`− (p+ 1))) + γ + c |{j | `j(C(G)) ≤ m}|
q`(G)(q`(G) + 1)
< −γ − cq`(G) + |{j | `j(C(G)) < `}|
q`(G)(q`(G) + 1)
−
m−1∑
p=1
(H(`− p)−H(`− (p+ 1))) + γ
+ c
|{j | `j(C(G)) ≤ m}|
q`(G)(q`(G) + 1)
< −c 1
q`(G) + 1
−
m−1∑
p=1
(H(`− p)−H(`− (p+ 1)))
< 0;
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and so i has no incentive to establish such new link. In conclusion, if condition (i) from the theorem
statement holds, then no agent has in incentive to establish a link with any agent that has a lower
level.
Case 3: Assume i has any level 0 ≤ ` ≤ k − 1 and that she considers severing any of
her existing edges. From Corollary B.1, we know that she has no incentive to sever any single
edge. Now, consider any agent j such that ij ∈ G belongs to some undirected edge. If the
undirected edge is a critical edge, i.e., |Pi(G)| = 2, then it is easy to show that ui(G− ij)−ui(G) =
−γ + H(` + 1) − H(`) − c − c |{j | `j(C(G))<`}|2 . Having this previous expression being less than
zero would suffice for i to not have an incentive to severe the edge ij, which is the same as
choosing a function H that satisfies condition (ii) from the theorem statement. On the other hand,
if the undirected edge is not a critical edge, so that |Pi(G)| > 2, then it is easy to show that
ui(G− ij)− ui(G) = −γ − c |{j | `j(C(G))<`}|+|Pi(G)||Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|−1) < 0; and thus, i has no incentive in severing the
edge ij.
In conclusion, from all the previous analyzed cases, if G is a sequential hierarchy with more
than one level, then we only need to define the non-negative monotonic function H as stipulated
by the conditions (i) and (ii) of the theorem statement in order to finally obtain the sought game
G such that G is an equilibrium network for G.
Part II: Now, we need to prove that any equilibrium network is a sequential hierarchy as
stipulated in items (i) and (ii) of the theorem statement. Consider the given equilibrium network
G. From Lemma B.1 we immediately conclude that G is a hierarchical structure with complete
connected components. Note that this lemma does not specify that G must be connected. However,
from the proof of the same lemma, if we assume G is not connected, then there is always an incentive
for some agent to form a single edge with an agent from another complete connected component
of the same level, which by contradiction implies that there is only one connected component per
any level in G. Now, we claim that any agent in G must have single edges towards any other
agent with a higher rank than her. Assume this is not the case and take any i, j ∈ N such that
ij /∈ G and `i(C(G)) < `j(C(G)), then it follows easily that i has an incentive to form links with j
since such action would increase her utility by γ > 0, giving a contradiction. Thus, in observance
of Definition 3.1, we have proved that G is a sequential hierarchy. It should be noted that, from
our previous analysis in Part I, the number of agents in each complete connected component of G
(when there is more than one level) is determined by the utility parameters (γ,H, c) satisfying the
conditions (i) and (ii) of the theorem statement. This concludes the proof that any equilibrium
network is a sequential hierarchy as stipulated in items (i) and (ii) of the theorem statement.
Finally, assume we have a sequential hierarchy G such that there exists some level ` > 1 such
that: 1) for any i ∈ N that has level `, we have |{j | `j(C(G)) < `}| ≥ 2|Pi(G)|
2
2+|Pi(G)|+|Pi(G)|2 ; and 2) for
any p ∈ N that has level `−1, we have |Pp(G)| = 2. Then, we claim that G cannot be an equilibrium
network for any game. To see this, observe condition 1) implies
( |Pi(G)|+|{j | `j(C(G))<`}|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+1)
)
≥ 1 +
|{j | `j(C(G))<`}|
2 , which immediately implies both (3) and (4) cannot hold simultaneously because of
condition 2), for any utility parameters (γ,H, c).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Throughout the proof, let Ti(G) := |Nout(i, G)|γ. We adopt the same no-
tation introduced at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.1, and we additionally introduce the
following notation: given nodes i, j ∈ N , let i not→ j denote the fact that there does not exist any
path between i and j in G, and let i− j denote that i and j are (weakly) connected, i.e., i→ j or
j → i.
Part I: We first analyze the conditions under which any given hierarchical structure, as in
items (i), (ii) and (iii) of the theorem statement, is the equilibrium network for some game G.
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Consider a given network G that has one or more hierarchical structures. The remaining problem
is to find the utility parameters (γ,H, c) so that G is an equilibrium network for the game G =
(N, u,A, γ,H, c). Now, we analyze the conditions that ensure no agent has an incentive and/or
is able to form a new link or severe any existing link, so that G can be properly defined as an
equilibrium network of G.
Case 1: Assume any agent i that has level 0 < ` ≤ k−1, with k > 1 being the number of levels in
the hierarchical structure for which i belongs to, is considering establishing a link with any agent j
that has rank `−m for any appropriate m ≥ 1, i.e., establish a backward connection. First, assume
ji ∈ G. Then, following a similar procedure as for Case 1 of Part I in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we
obtain ui(G+ij)−ui(G) = γ+H(`−m)−H(`)+c
∑
p∈N sin(i,G)\{j}
(
1
|Pi(G,p)| − 1|Pi(G+ij,p)|
)
+ c|Pi(G,j)|
with |Pi(G + ij, p)| ≥ |Pi(G, p)| for any p ∈ N sin(i, G) \ {j}, so that i does not have an incentive
to establish a link with j if the inequality (5) from condition (i) of the theorem statement is
satisfied. Assume i has an incentive to establish this link with j, then since agents are consensual,
we need to analyze if j would consent to such action from i. Then, it is easy to show that
uj(G+ ij)− uj(G) = c
∑
p∈N sin(j,G)
(
1
|Pj(G,p)| − 1|Pj(G+ij,p)|
)
≥ 0 since |Pi(G+ ij, p)| ≥ |Pi(G, p)| for
any p ∈ N sin(j,G), and thus j would accept such proposition. Then, the sufficient and necessary
condition for not incentivizing a backward connection from i is the satisfaction of condition (i)
from the theorem statement. Second, assume ji /∈ G and j → i. Then, it is easy to see that
ui(G+ ij)−ui(G) = γ+H(`−m)−H(`). Assume the worst case, i.e., i has an incentive in making
such connection. Then, we find that uj(G+ ij)− uj(G) = −c < 0, and so j will not accept a new
link from i. Third, assume ji /∈ G and j not→ i (notice that i and j may or may not belong to the
same hierarchical structure). Then, it is easy to show that i has an incentive in establishing such
link, and that for j we have uj(G+ ij)−uj(G) = H(`+ 1)−H(`−m)− c, and so j will not accept
such connection if and only if
H(`+ 1)−H(`−m) < c. (9)
Case 2: Assume any agent i that has level 0 ≤ ` < k− 1, with k > 1 being the number of levels
in the hierarchical structure for which i belongs to, considers making a forward connection with
any agent j that has rank ` + m for any appropriate m ≥ 1. We already know from Part I in the
proof of Theorem 3.1 that i has an incentive to establish a link with j. If m = 1 and i→ j, then it
follows that uj(G+ ij)− uj(G) = − c|Pj(G,i)| < 0. If m = 1 and i
not→ j, or m > 1 (whether i− j or
not), then uj(G+ ij)− uj(G) = −c < 0. Then, we conclude that j has no incentive in accepting a
connection from i.
Case 3: Assume any agent i that has level 0 ≤ ` ≤ k− 1, with k ≥ 1 being the number of levels
in the hierarchical structure for which i belongs to, considers making a connection with any agent j
of rank ` (so that ij, ji /∈ G). Then, we already know i has an incentive for making such connection.
If j ∈ Γ(i, G), then we have uj(G + ij) − uj(G) = − c|Pj(G,i)| < 0 and thus j will not accept such
link from i. If j /∈ Γ(i, G) (whether i belongs or not to the same hierarchical structure as j), then
we obtain uj(G + ij) − uj(G) = H(` + 1) −H(`) − c and so j has no incentive in accepting such
link from i if and only if
H(`+ 1)−H(`) < c. (10)
Case 4: Assume any agent i that has any rank ` considers severing any of her existing edges.
From Corollary B.1, we know that she has no incentive to sever any single edge. Now, consider
any agent j such that ij ∈ G belongs to some undirected edge. If the undirected edge is a
critical edge and i can increase its level by severing the edge ij, then it is easy to show that
ui(G− ij)− ui(G) = −γ +H(`+ 1)−H(`)− c
∑
p∈N sin(i,G)
(
1
|Pi(G−ij,p)| − 1|Pi(G,p)|
)
− c. Then, the
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condition H(`+ 1)−H(`) < γ + c∑p∈N sin(i,G) ( 1|Pi(G−ij,p)| − 1|Pi(G,p)|)+ c would suffice for i to not
have an incentive to sever the edge ij, which is expressed in equation (7) from condition (iii) of the
theorem statement. On the other hand, if the undirected edge is not a critical edge, then |Γ(i, G)| >
2 and it is easy to show that ui(G− ij)−ui(G) = −γ−c
∑
p∈N sin(i,G)
(
1
|Pi(G−ij,p)| − 1|Pi(G,p)|
)
−c < 0
since |Pi(G− ij, p)| ≤ |Pi(G, p)| for any p ∈ N sin(i, G); and thus, i has no incentive in severing the
edge ij.
Notice that enforcing inequalities (9) and (10) amounts to the condition (ii) of the theorem state-
ment. Therefore, if there exist utility parameters (γ,H, c) that satisfy the conditions (i), (ii) and
(iii) from the theorem statement, we conclude that the given sequential hierarchy is an equilibrium
network.
Part II: Now, consider a given equilibrium network G. From Lemma B.1 we immediately
conclude that G is a hierarchical structure or is composed of isolated hierarchical structures (since
this lemma does not specify whether G is connected or not). Then, from our previous analysis
in Part I, it follows that the utility parameters (γ,H, c) must be such that the conditions (i), (ii)
and (iii) in the theorem statement are satisfied. This concludes the proof that any equilibrium
network is composed by one or multiple hierarchical structures.
Finally, we prove the existence of hierarchical structures that are not equilibrium networks of
any possible hierarchical network formation game. For the case in which the hierarchical structures
are sequential hierarchies, we can use the same construction given in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Now,
we focus on the case in which the hierarchical structures are not sequential hierarchies. Consider a
hierarchical structure G with more than one component per any level and with complete connected
components, and such that the only single edges in the graph are as follows: for any i, j ∈ N
with `j(C(G)) = `j(C(G)) − 1 ≥ 0, it holds pk ∈ G (and so kp /∈ G) for any p ∈ Γ(i, G),
k ∈ Γ(j,G). Moreover, also assume |Pi(G)| > 2 for any i ∈ N , i.e., there are no critical edges in
G. We immediately notice from the topology of G and our discussion above that the expression in
equation (5) from condition (i) of the theorem statement becomes
H(`)−H(`− 1) > γ + c
( |Pi(G)|+ |Pj(G)|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+ 1)
)
(11)
for any i, j ∈ N with `i(C(G)) = ` and `j(C(G)) = ` − 1, ` > 0. Assume G has more than one
hierarchical structure, and that one of them has ` + 1 > 0 levels with ip ∈ N denoting any agent
of such hierarchical structure such that `i(C(G)) = p ∈ [0, `− 1]. Consider any level 0 < ` ≤ k− 1.
Now, observe that condition (i) (using (11)) and condition (ii) imply
H(`)−H(0) > `γ + c
∑`
p=1
( |Pip(G)|+ |Pip−1(G)|
|Pip(G)|(|Pip(G)|+ 1)
)
, (12)
H(`)−H(0) < c, (13)
respectively. We claim that if there exists some level ` such that 1 ≤ ∑`p=1 ( |Pip (G)|+|Pip−1 (G)||Pip (G)|(|Pip (G)|+1)),
then there are no utility parameters that can define a game such that G is its equilibrium network.
To see this, observe that this condition implies c < `γ+c
∑`
p=1
( |Pip (G)|+|Pip−1 (G)|
|Pip (G)|(|Pip (G)|+1)
)
for any γ, c > 0,
which makes it impossible to choose a reward function H such that conditions (12) and (13) are
satisfied, which in turn violates both conditions (i) and (ii) from the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. We analyze the conditions under which any given network as in (i) or (ii)
is the equilibrium network for some game G with consensual agents. Given the network, the
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remaining problem is to find the appropriate utility parameters (γ,H, c) so that it becomes the
equilibrium network for the game G = (N, u,A, γ,H, c).
Consider G to be a given hierarchical structure as in statement (i) with k > 1 levels. First,
observe that since all connected components are complete subgraphs with more than two nodes, then
there are no critical edges in G, so that we do not need to analyze the satisfaction of condition (iii)
of Theorem 3.3. We immediately notice from the structure of G and the proof of Theorem 3.3 that
equation (6) of condition (ii) from Theorem 3.3 becomes
H(`)−H(`− 1) > γ + c
( |Pi(G)|+ |Pj(G)|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+ 1)
)
(14)
with ` > 0 and any i, j ∈ N with `i(C(G)) = ` > 0 and `j(C(G)) = ` − 1. Then, it follows
immediately that we can first choose any γ, c > 0 and then an appropriate non-negative monotonic
function H satisfying equation (14) to form the sought game.
Now, consider G to be a given network as in statement (ii). Observe that all isolated networks
in G have more than one level. First, we make the observation that, considering any agent i, j ∈ N
with `i(C(G)) = ` > 0 and `j(C(G)) = ` − 1, then, from the conditions of G, the following
inequalities hold:
|Pi(G)|+ |Pj(G)|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+ 1) ≤
2
|Pi(G)|+ 1 < 1, (15)
since |Pi(G)| > 2.
Using the inequality in (14), we conclude that if there exists a tuple of utility parameters
(γ,H, c) such that they satisfy the condition
γ + cU(G) < H(`)−H(`− 1) < c with U(G) = max
i : `i(C(G))=`
j : `j(C(G))=`−1
( |Pi(G)|+ |Pj(G)|
|Pi(G)|(|Pi(G)|+ 1)
)
, (16)
then this will imply the satisfaction of conditions (i) and (ii) from Theorem 3.3 and thus create a
game such that G is its equilibrium network. We claim that such tuple exist. To see this, notice
that (15) implies cU(G) < c, and so we can choose a sufficiently small γ > 0 so that γ+ cU(G) < c,
and therefore we can squeeze in the difference H(`)−H(`− 1) > 0 (which immediately defines the
reward function H appropriately) so that (16) holds.
C Proofs for the Dynamic Analysis section
Proof of Theorem 4.4. For any type of agents, let E be the set of equilibrium networks. Consider a
set of graphs S = {G1, . . . , Gk} (with, obviously, different elements). We say S is an invariant set
in our network formation process if the following holds: for any elements Gi, Gj ∈ S, if G(t) ∈ Gi
then G(t′) = Gj for infinitely many t′ ≥ t with probability one. Notice that this implies that, if
Gi ∈ S and Gk /∈ S, then there is zero probability that the network formation process starting at
Gi can eventually be the network Gk. In particular, an invariant set S has only one element if and
only if this element is an invariant network (see Definition 4.2). Finally, we remark that in the
literature of Markov chains, this concept of invariant set defined above is equivalent to the concept
of an irreducible closed set of persistent states [16].
Now, according to the Decomposition Theorem of Markov Chains, the state space of the Markov
chainM can be partitioned uniquely as the union of a set of transient states (if such set exists) and
one or more invariant sets. Now, from the fact that G(t) can only take a finite number of different
topologies, or, equivalently, from the fact that the Markov chainM is finite, it is known that, with
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probability one, the network G(t) enters an invariant set in finite time (indeed, each graph in this
invariant set is a non-null persistent state [16]). Obviously, if the network formation process starts
in an equilibrium network, we know from Proposition 4.2 that this finite time is actually zero. In
conclusion, from Proposition 4.2, if any invariant set S has only one element, then we conclude
that G(t) converges to an equilibrium network with probability one.
For the rest of the proof, pick any type of agents for the game. Now, given a graph G, define
the set G¯ as follows: G¯ = {{i, j} | ij ∈ G or ji ∈ G}.
Now, we make a couple of observations:
(a) Consider a single edge ij ∈ G(t) that belongs to a directed cycle at any time t, and that i
has level `. Then, it is easy to see that H(`+ k) is the hierarchical reward of i for the graph
G(t)− ij, for some k ≥ 0. Now, observe that ui(G(t)− ij)−ui(G(t)) = −γ+H(`+k)−H(`).
If k = 0, then G(t+1) = G(t); otherwise, if k > 0, then, from the conditions on the increments
of the reward function in the theorem statement, we get that ui(G(t)− ij) > ui(G(t)) and so
G(t+ 1) = G(t)− ij.
(b) From the proof of Lemma B.1, we conclude that: if ij belongs to a directed cycle in G(t),
then, with positive probability, ij, ji ∈ G(t+ 1).
Let G(to) be the graph at any time to ≥ 0. Then, with these two observations, we can construct
a finite sequence of pairs of agents such that they modify the network according to the following
steps (a step can be skipped if not applicable):
1) eventually makes the graph connected at some time t1 ≥ to, i.e., G(t1) has no isolated networks
(this is easy to see for non-consensual agents, and for consensual agents, it follows from the
fact that inequality (6) in item (ii) of Theorem 3.3 cannot be satisfied under the conditions
on the increments of the reward function H),
2) eventually makes the graph to have no directed cycles at some time t2 ≥ t1,
3) takingG(t2), it starts establishing one or multiple single edges that may result in the formation
of new directed cycles (if any), and then immediately turn these edges into undirected ones
according to (b) (for example, for non-consensual agents, new directed edges may appear
when an agent i forms a single edge with another agent j of the same level and such that
there is a path from j to i); and repeat this process until the graph has no directed cycles
and cannot form new directed cycles at some time t3 ≥ t2; notice that G(t3) is a hierarchical
structure,
4) severs any existing critical edge in G(t3) (i.e., turns it into a single edge), and continues
doing this process until no new critical edge is found in the graph at some time t4 ≥ t3 (this
can always be done since the condition on the increments of the reward function H implies
that the inequality (7) is always not satisfied, which, from the proof of Theorem 3.3, let us
conclude that any existing critical edge can always be severed).
Notice that the graph G(t4) is still a hierarchical structure, since severing critical edges (as in
step 4)) does not introduce directed cycles, nor introduce new isolated networks. Since G(t4) is
a hierarchical structure and the increments of the reward function H are large enough, there is
no incentive for any agent to establish an edge with any agent with a lower level. Notice that for
non-consensual agents, step 3) implies all agents with the same level form a complete subgraph.
Notice also that for consensual agents, if a single edge is established between two agents i and
j with the same level in G(t4), then, for any t ≥ t4, this single edge will not be an undirected
edge with probability one, nor no new directed cycle that contains i and j will be formed with
probability one. Therefore, we conclude that, for any type of agents, no new undirected edges nor
new directed cycles can be formed for any G(t) ≥ G(t4) with probability one.
So, given the arbitrary initial network Go, let us define T to be the random time at which G(t)
becomes a hierarchical structure as characterized by G(t4). Then, it is easy to observe that T is
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a stopping time and we can use the first Borel-Cantelli lemma (as in [5, proof of Theorem 3.1]) to
prove that T <∞ with probability one, since any finite sequence of pairs of agents that implements
the appropriate changes in the steps 1) to 4) (if any) always exists with positive probability at any
time t. Then, we can use the strong Markov property, and assume that the network formation
process starts at T with the graph G(T ). Since only new single edges may appear at future time-
steps and these single edges cannot form directed cycles, we conclude that, with probability one,
G¯(t+ 1) ⊇ G¯(t) for any t ≥ T , i.e., |G¯(t+ 1)| ≥ |G¯(t)|. Moreover, for any t ≥ T , we conclude that
G(t) has a pair of agents that can establish a single edge at time t+1 if and only if |G¯(t+1)| > |G¯(t)|
with positive probability. Now, consider any invariant set S. It follow from these observations that
if G(t) ∈ S, then |G¯(t+ 1)| = |G¯(t)| with probability one. However, this only occurs if and only if
no new single edges can be added, i.e., when |S| = 1. Then, we conclude that any invariant set is
an invariant network and so that the network converges to an equilibrium network.
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